Grandfather rights in the market for airport slots / by Gernot Sieg. - (Working Paper Series / Economics Department ; No. 04)

Autor/en :Sieg, Gernot
Institut / Verlag :Braunschweig : Inst. für Volkswirtschaftslehre, 2008. - [Neue, verbesserte Ausgabe 2009]
Fakultät :01 - Carl-Friedrich Gauß-Fakultät
Dokumente :
Umfang :21 S.
Sprache :englisch
Kurzfassung :Grandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports prefer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport prots increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The prot-maximizing rule is a use-it- g < 1-or-lose-it rule.
Schlagwörter :Airports, Grandfather rights, use-it-or-lose-it rule, airport slots
Sachgebiet :330 Wirtschaft
Typ :Publikationen der TU Braunschweig
Format :Text/Dokument
URN:NBN :urn:nbn:de:gbv:084-24464
Zitierfähige URL :http://www.digibib.tu-bs.de/?docid=00026711